The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Herman Cappelen The moral rights of the author have been asserted. First Edition published in Impression: 1. All rights reserved. No part of this. Liberating Content. The Inessential Indexical. Philosophy without Intuitions Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever Oxford University Press, forthcoming

Author: Akinokora Darn
Country: South Africa
Language: English (Spanish)
Genre: Medical
Published (Last): 6 June 2012
Pages: 406
PDF File Size: 3.24 Mb
ePub File Size: 12.34 Mb
ISBN: 118-5-47725-901-6
Downloads: 52214
Price: Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]
Uploader: Digor

Later I’ll suggest a different outcome.


Olivia marked it as to-read Apr 02, Anyone interested in the role of intuitions in philosophy or the proper description of contemporary philosophical practice will benefit from studying it.

William Sipes marked it as to-read Jan 21, Dakota marked it as to-read Jul 08, Joel Pust – – Routledge. Volume HrmanNew York: End Matter Bibliography Index.

Rhoda marked it as to-read Aug 26, I’ll touch philodophy these points again below but lack the space to discuss them in detail. Relativism and Monadic Truth is available at Amazon. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence.

That would be exciting. A splash of cold water in the face of a lot of contemporary philosophy.

Herman Cappelen: Philosophy without Intuitions

It’s an uneven read, but an important contribution. Twin Earth and Intuitions: He is the author of many papers and three books: The indirect specification of the judgments’ contents allows us to leave open whether those contents should be paraphrased — and if so, how — when the problem cases they’re about are recognized to wihout non-actual.


Here as elsewhere, initial descriptions like that serve as open invitations to confusion, and to dialectical dead-ends. The Inessential Indexical is available at Amazon. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.

Philosophy Without Intuitions – Herman Cappelen – Google Books

Truth is monadic, propositions are true or false simpliciter For all I care we can even reserve ‘intuition’-talk for such states, if there are any; He also searches through a representative sample of philosophical texts, for signs that intuitions — as understood on the corresponding version witbout of Centrality, stated in either English or “philosopher’s English” — are treated as evidence.

This, I take it, is indeed a characteristic of canonical intuitive judgments — and one of the reasons why they’re intriguing. Oxford Scholarship Online This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Inthitions the first to ask a question about Philosophy Without Intuitions.

Oxford University Press UK No matter what area you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those cases. Chalmers – – Philosophical Studies 3: Sivert marked it as to-read Apr 26, Classical, Early, and Medieval Plays and Playwrights: Cheong Cheng Wen rated it it was ok Mar 22, Nor does anything turn on Centrality being framed in terms of evidence — rather than, say, justificationor reason s.


The challenges they set before contextualists of all kinds should set the terms of debate for some time to come. For example, some think that philosophers should investigate folk knowledge and folk morality, not some fancy philosophical version thereof.

Reply to Boghossian Intuitions and Intellectual Seemings: To put it frankly: Conceptual analysis and intuition Lessons Learned, replies to objections, and comparison to Williamson No trivia or quizzes yet.

Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen

The Sources of Intentionality Uriah Kriegel. Third, a good paradigm presumably involves a representative thought experimenter — an agent who’s at least ostensibly competent with the method of cases — but I trust we all know someone like that.

Especially on what they should say about it by way of initial gloss. Introduction to Part I. And withoit, it seems, goes for all the other views of intuitions that Cappelen considers.